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Abstract 
Myanmar’s apparel industry had long been denied access to Western markets due to 
sanctions against its military government. The birth of a “civilian” government in 
March 2011 improved Myanmar’s relations with the international community, and 
Western sanctions were largely lifted. Regained market access is expected to trigger 
rapid growth of Myanmar’s apparel exports. This paper examines this impact with a 
comparison to Vietnam’s apparel industry. 
The industry’s prospects are getting bright, but the business environment has 
recently changed drastically in Myanmar. A new challenge for Myanmar’s apparel 
industry is remaining globally competitive. This paper also examines advantages and 
disadvantages that apparel firms in Myanmar experience. Although its abundance of 
low-wage workers remains a source of competitiveness, Myanmar needs its 
government to play a more active role to build the foundation of the industry. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Asia had begun its ascent up the development ladder through garment exports (Sachs, 
2005:195), and Myanmar follows suit. With its abundant supply of low-wage labor, 
Myanmar has an apparent comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. In the 
country, apparel sewing has been the only manufacturing entity that participates in 
regional and global production and distribution networks. Apparel represents the only 
type of exported manufactured goods in the country. 
Nevertheless, this apparent comparative advantage had long been suppressed, mainly 
due to a hostile international environment. Myanmar’s apparel industry has both grown 
and declined over the past two decades subject to the changing international 
environment and consequent availability and absence of market access. Myanmar 
increased its apparel exports steadily in the 1990s and up through the beginning of the 
21st century, but the exports have greatly declined since 2003, when the Unites States 
imposed an import ban on all Myanmar’s products. 
Contrarily, Vietnam increased its apparel exports steadily in the 1990s, and rapidly in 
the first decade of 21st century. The Vietnamese case is in sharp contrast with 
Myanmar’s, and provides an interesting reference point. Myanmar and Vietnam are both 
located in mainland Southeast Asia, and both have medium-sized populations, with 
about 60 million for Myanmar and about 90 million for Vietnam. They are latecomers in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and their GDP per capita was 
less than US$100 in 1990.1 The two countries experienced centrally controlled planning 
economies, and both opened up their economies and started exporting apparel in the 
early 1990s. However, their performances since then have been very different. In 2010, 
the export value of apparel from Vietnam was 20 times higher than that from Myanmar. 
What are the reasons behind such a gap in performance between the two countries’ 
apparel industries? Many reasons have been identified, but among them a critical 
difference is access/non-access to international markets (Goto and Kudo, 2013). On one 
hand, Vietnam’s apparel industry enjoyed increasing access to the global economy and 
international markets by its improved relations with the United States, particularly in the 
first decade of 21st century. On the other, Myanmar had been losing access to 
international markets by strengthened sanctions from the United States, the European 
Union (EU), and others. 
                                                 
1 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook Database (April, 
2013), Myanmar’s GDP per capita of 1990 was US$68 and that of Vietnam was US$98. 
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This paper argues that Myanmar’s apparel industry’s lack of or limited access to 
international markets has been a major factor behind its stagnation in the last two 
decades, even though people have pointed out many other constraints and obstacles 
including bad government policy. In this regard, the experience of Vietnam’s apparel 
industry offers a contrasting case without sanctions from the international community, 
and such a situation is currently being realized in Myanmar since the establishment of a 
“civilian” government in March 2011. Then, this paper envisages the prospects of 
Myanmar’s apparel industry under the new environment. 
The prospects are getting brighter for the apparel industry in Myanmar due to its 
restored access to international markets. However, the business environment 
surrounding Myanmar’s apparel industry has drastically changed in recent years. A 
sharp rise in the local currency’s real exchange rate pushed up apparel workers’ wages 
in terms of the US dollar. In spite of the apparent existence of a nation-wide labor 
surplus, there has been an occasional shortage of workers in Yangon. Infrastructure 
services including electricity and transportation are still unreliable and costly compared 
to competitor countries. New challenges for Myanmar’s apparel industry are expanding 
its production capacity to meet increased demand and remaining competitive in 
international markets. This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages that 
apparel firms experience in Myanmar. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the historical background 
of the country’s apparel industry. Section 3 examines the impact of market 
access/non-access to Western countries on the growth and decline of Myanmar’s apparel 
industry with comparison to Vietnam’s case. Section 4 examines the advantages and 
disadvantages that apparel firms in Myanmar experience. In conclusion, we draw 
readers’ attention to the role of the government. The military government had long 
suppressed realization of the apparel industry’s comparative advantage. Now the 
government has to play a more active role to build the foundation of the industry to 
capitalize on the opportunities provided by restored access to international markets. 
 
 
2 Growth and Decline of Myanmar’s Apparel Industry 
 
Figure 1 presents the export performance of Myanmar’s garment industry based on 
two different sources of information: the United Nations’ Comtrade and import data 
from 22 major countries that import Myanmar-made apparel. Between 1990 and 2001, 
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Myanmar’s apparel industry increased its exports by 69 times. Apparel’s share of 
Myanmar’s total exports increased from 2.5 per cent in 1990 to 39.5 per cent in 2000. 
Apparel became the largest exported good of the country. Although the United States 
and the EU deprived Myanmar of the generalized system of preferences (GSP) status 
since 1997, they did not deny Myanmar access to their markets in the 1990s. As a result, 
the United States offered the largest market, and in 2000, it absorbed more than 50 per 
cent of Myanmar’s apparel exports. The EU provided the second largest market and was 
the recipient of nearly 40 per cent in the same year. 
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(Source) UN comtrade and World Trade Atlas.
Figure 1 Myanmar's apparel exports
UN Comtrade
22 Major importers
( Million US$)
 
(Source) UN Comtrade and World Trade Atlas. 
 
However, Myanmar lost access to the United States’ markets in 2003 due to sanctions, 
which included an import ban.2 This led to a drastic decline in Myanmar’s apparel 
exports, and by 2005, they had contracted to 38 per cent of the export value of 2001, the 
peak year. As a result, apparel firms in Myanmar started to explore Asian markets, Japan 
in particular. In 2007, Japan became the largest market for Myanmar’s apparel exports, 
together with Germany, and increased its share to absorb about 50 per cent of all 
Myanmar’s apparel exports in 2012 (Figure 2). South Korea also increased its share 
                                                 
2 On the assessment of impact of United States sanctions on Myanmar’s apparel industry, refer to 
Kudo (2008a). 
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from 2010 onwards, and accepted about a third of Myanmar’s apparel exports in 2012. 
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Figure 2 Myanmar's apparel exports by destination
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3 Market Access 
 
A most influential factor that harmed Myanmar’s apparel industry was obviously denial 
of access to the markets of advanced Western nations under the international 
community’s sanctions regime. How serious was the damage? Can denial of or 
limitations to access to Western markets mostly explain the stagnation of Myanmar’s 
apparel industry during the period of military government? To answer this question, we 
compare the performance of exports in both Myanmar’s and Vietnam’s apparel 
industries. 
Like Myanmar, Vietnam entered the export-oriented apparel industry in the early 
1990s, and steadily increased its apparel exports through this decade. Vietnam’s apparel 
exports were close to double those of Myanmar’s in 2000. Since then, the gap in apparel 
exports between the two countries has become extremely large (Figure 3). In 2010, 
Vietnam’s apparel exports were 20 times larger than those of Myanmar’s. Given their 
similarity in resource endowment and historical background, Vietnam’s experiences can 
be possibly regarded as a model for Myanmar’s apparel industry if Myanmar had access 
to international markets in the last two decades. 
In this section, we divide the international markets into two categories: markets that 
 7 
were affected by Western sanctions and markets that were not. The former includes the 
markets of the United States and the EU, and the latter includes those of Japan and 
South Korea.3 The United States, the EU, and Japan accounted for 77.8 per cent of the 
world’s total apparel imports in 2010, and most of the trade flow was from developing 
countries to developed countries (Fukunishi and Yamagata, 2013:5-6). Therefore, 
market access to these three countries is almost equal to that of the world’s markets. 
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(Source) UN Comtrade.
Figure 3 Apparel exports of Myanmar and Vietnam(Million US$)
US Sanctions (July 2003)
US BTA (Dec. 2001)
 
 
3.1 Demands Affected by Sanctions 
As described in the previous section of this paper, Myanmar’s apparel exports had 
been seriously damaged by the United States’ sanctions of 2003. By contrast, Vietnam’s 
apparel exports have shown continued robust growth since 2002, having better access to 
the United States markets. Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United 
States (US Bilateral Trade Agreement: USBTA) in July 2000, which went into force in 
December 2001. The USBTA accorded Vietnam a most favored nation (MFN) status, 
and was instrumental in facilitating Vietnam’s exports to the United States (Goto, 2009). 
The share of the United States in Vietnam’s total apparel exports jumped from 3.2 per 
cent in 2000 to 63.0 per cent in 2003. Access to the United States’ markets contributed 
                                                 
3 South Korea has increased its apparel imports from Myanmar since 2010. However, this paper 
mainly deals with the Japanese market as one that has not been affected by Western sanctions. 
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to the rapid growth of Vietnam’s apparel industry in the first decade of the 21st century. 
The United States’ contribution to the growth of Vietnam’s apparel exports was more 
than 60 per cent for 2001−2011.4 
Myanmar exported more than eight times the apparel to the United States than 
Vietnam in 2000, one year before the USBTA with Vietnam came into force, and two 
years before the United States’ import ban on Myanmar was imposed (Table 1). The 
United States’ market size is much larger than that of Japan. The United States imported 
apparel worth US$77.9 billion in 2012, while Japan imported apparel worth US$32.1 
billion in the same year.5 Moreover, it is said that the United States’ markets are easier 
for apparel firms in developing countries to enter since the quantity of orders are large, 
designs are simple, and customers and buyers are not particular about sewing quality 
(Goto et al, 2011:364-368). On the contrary, Japanese customers and buyers are 
meticulous about sewing quality, strict on delivery, and order small quantities with 
complicated designs, although the sewing charges are a little higher than those for the 
United States’ market. Therefore, the United States’ markets were very attractive to 
apparel firms in Myanmar at that time. If Myanmar had been given continued access to 
the United States’ markets, its apparel industry could have rapidly grown in the last 
decade, as shown by Vietnam’s experience. 
 
                                                 
4 Calculated by the author based on the Vietnam export figures drawn by World Trade Atlas. 
5 Here, the item “apparel” includes both Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(HS) 61 (knit apparel) and HS 62 (woven apparel). 
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Table 1 Apparel exports of Myanmar and Vietnam to the United States, the EU and Japan (US$ million, times, %)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Myanmar (Value) 85.3 127.8 185.7 403.5 408.0 298.6 232.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vietnam (Value) 25.9 28.4 36.1 47.2 47.8 876.0 2339.0 2505.9 2665.4 3158.5 4293.5 5151.6 5005.7 5797.5 6556.0 7027.0
Gap (VNM/MYM) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 2.9 10.1 - - - - - - - - -
Myanmar (Share) 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Vietnam (Share) 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1.5% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8% 4.3% 5.7% 7.0% 7.8% 8.0% 8.3% 9.0%
Myanmar (Value) 94.1 118.0 155.1 276.1 348.8 307.2 339.9 457.4 237.1 256.6 215.7 210.4 174.4 175.6 179.9 139.5
Vietnam (Value) 542.8 580.3 614.8 671.9 661.5 616.0 554.0 757.2 820.5 1232.7 1471.1 1758.8 1631.4 1774.1 2299.1 2166.9
Gap (VNM/MYM) 5.8 4.9 4.0 2.4 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.7 3.5 4.8 6.8 8.4 9.4 10.1 12.8 15.5
Myanmar (Share) 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Vietnam (Share) 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4%
Myanmar (Value) 1.1 2.3 2.1 4.6 7.5 15.0 32.2 44.8 52.7 71.4 95.5 132.6 149.2 183.4 348.7 408.2
Vietnam (Value) 483.5 422.7 446.1 579.7 524.6 458.8 484.5 548.1 588.1 615.7 690.1 837.8 1005.6 1170.2 1778.9 2090.8
Gap (VNM/MYM) 440.1 183.0 213.5 126.9 70.2 30.6 15.0 12.2 11.2 8.6 7.2 6.3 6.7 6.4 5.1 5.1
Myanmar (Share) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 1.3%
Vietnam (Share) 3.0% 3.0% 2.8% 3.1% 2.9% 2.8% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 3.1% 3.4% 4.2% 4.6% 5.7% 6.5%
(Note) The figure includes both HS61 (knit apparel) and HS62 (woven apparel).
(Source) World Trade Atlas.
US
EU
Japan
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In addition to the United States’ markets, EU markets were also affected by the 
sanctions. The EU (15 member countries only) imported US$90.7 billion worth of 
apparels in 2012, which was 16 per cent larger than imports by the United States. 
Myanmar’s apparel exports to the EU increased from US$94.1 million in 1997 to 
US$457.4 million in 2004, an increase of 4.9 times. However, since then, its apparel 
exports to the EU continuously declined, by around 60 per cent, to about US$180 
million in 2011. This decline was not caused by the deprivation of GSP status on 
Myanmar’s imports by the EU in 1997, because Myanmar’s apparel industry had 
successfully increased its exports to the EU between 1997 and 2004. 
The decline was apparently caused by the United States’ sanctions of 2003 even 
though they did not directly target EU markets. Some buyers for EU markets became 
reluctant to purchase made-in-Myanmar apparel, being afraid of possible boycott 
campaigns by consumers and/or NGOs stimulated by the United States’ sanctions of 
2003. Some EU members introduced a targeted import ban against designated apparel 
manufacturers in Myanmar. For example, the apparel manufacturing joint venture 
between Myanmar Daewoo International and the Union of Myanmar Economic 
Holdings Ltd., a company owned by active and former military officers, was blocked 
access to the German market. 
In 2004, Myanmar’s apparel exports to the EU were US$457.4 million, while those of 
Vietnam were US$757.2 million, just under double of those of Myanmar. Vietnam has 
since increased its apparel exports to the EU, reaching US$2.3 billion in 2011, tripling 
its total of 2004. On the contrary, Myanmar exports were limited to US$180.0 million in 
2011, a 60 per cent decline from 2004. Consequently, the gap ratio of Vietnam’s apparel 
exports compared with Myanmar’s increased from 1.6 times in 2003 to 15.5 times in 
2012. If Myanmar had been given full access to EU markets like Vietnam, Myanmar’s 
apparel industry could have penetrated them in the last decade. 
The United States lifted its import ban on Myanmar on November 16, 2012, just three 
days before President Obama’s historic visit to Myanmar on November 19, 2012. The 
EU suspended its sanctions on Myanmar in April 2012 for one year, and permanently 
ended them the next year. In July 2013, the EU decided to bring Myanmar back under 
the “Everything But Arms (EBA)” preferential trade regime, which grants duty-free and 
quota-free access to the European market for all products except arms and ammunitions 
(EC, 2013). Myanmar’s apparel industry has thus restored its access to Western markets 
and many American and European apparel firms started to visit Myanmar seeking 
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business opportunities. Orders of apparel from the West will soon return to Myanmar. 
 
3.2 Demands Not Affected by Sanctions 
After falling to their lowest levels in 2005, Myanmar’s apparel exports have gradually 
recovered due to Asian demand, which was unaffected by Western sanctions. Unlike the 
EU, Asian countries’ customers generally are not sensitive to democracy and human 
rights issues of apparel-exporting countries. As a consequence, international buyers for 
Asian countries did not shun purchasing apparel from Myanmar despite Western 
sanctions. 
The recovery of Myanmar’s apparel exports has been first led by orders from Japan, 
followed by those from South Korea. In 2012, the former accounted for 49 per cent of 
Myanmar’s apparel exports, and the latter accounted for 33 per cent. Till 2003, Japan’s 
share of Myanmar’s apparel exports had been miniscule. When apparel firms in 
Myanmar lost their access to the United States’ markets, they first tried to shift their 
exports to EU markets. However, as mentioned above, the EU had also become 
reluctant to procure made-in-Myanmar products, due to fear of possible boycott 
campaigns. Around the same time, Japanese buyers had strengthened the “China Plus 
One” strategy against the increasing labor costs and shortage of workers in China’s 
apparel industry, and an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
occurred in South China and Hong Kong between November 2002 and July 2003. As a 
result, the motives of both demand and supplier sides met each other and it followed 
that Myanmar increases its apparel exports to Japan. 
In 2003, Myanmar’s apparel exports to Japan were only US$32.2 million, while those 
of Vietnam were US$484.5 million, 15 times larger than those of Myanmar (Table 1). 
Since then, Myanmar’s apparel exports to Japan steadily increased, reaching US$408.2 
million in 2012, an increase of 12.7 times. For the same period, Vietnam increased its 
apparel exports to Japan from US$484.5 million to US$2090.8 million, an increase of 
4.3 times. The gap in apparel exports to Japan between Vietnam and Myanmar declined 
from 15 times in 2003 to about 5 times in 2012. As a destination of Myanmar’s apparel 
exports, Japan increased its share from 2.2 per cent in 2002 to 49.0 per cent, the largest 
share, in 2012. 
Myanmar’s apparel exports to Japan have grown more rapidly than Vietnam’s for the 
period of 2004−2012. Nevertheless, the absolute gap in apparel exports to Japan 
between the two countries has widened from US$503 million in 2004 to US$1.7 billion 
in 2012. Japan was not an easy market for Myanmar apparel firms to enter. Goto et al. 
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(2011:364-365) examines different market conditions by export destination, considering 
the case of Vietnamese apparel suppliers. Most Vietnamese apparel produced for Japan 
is on the higher value-added end, with relatively complex designs and product 
specifications, compared with those for the United States and EU. The buyers in the 
Japanese market see Vietnamese suppliers’ key sources of competitiveness subject to 
stringent quality requirements. Thus, catering and entering to the Japanese market is 
generally recognized as being more difficult than gaining entry to the United States’ and 
the EU’s markets for Vietnamese apparel firms. This is probably true with the case of 
Myanmar’s apparel firms as well. 
It took a considerable time for apparel firms in Myanmar to enter the Japanese market. 
One of the earliest apparel firms in Myanmar that started production for the Japanese 
market was Kojima Apparel (Kudo ed., 2008b). It started full-fledged production in 
1999, but failed to continue operations since it could not meet the short lead time 
required for ladies fashion apparel, which was their specialized item. After the 
withdrawal of this Kojima Apparel, most of the apparel produced in Myanmar for the 
Japanese market are men’s suits, men’s shirts, men’s overcoats and work wear and so 
forth, apparel that require neither frequent style changes nor quick delivery. 
Most apparel for the Japanese market has been produced by foreign-affiliated 
companies, either 100 per cent foreign-owned or a joint venture with Myanmar’s firms 
(Table 2). This is a distinct feature for apparel production destined for the Japanese 
market. As Kudo (2010) described, Myanmar’s national firms vigorously entered 
apparel production for United States and EU markets in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Most firms that entered the apparel industry at that time were national ones. However, 
Myanmar’s national apparel firms apparently had difficulty entering the Japanese 
market even after they lost their biggest market due to the United States’ sanctions of 
2003. Consequently, the number of apparel firms that exported to the Japanese market 
was small. In 2007, the top three firms in Myanmar occupied nearly 50 per cent of its 
total apparel exports to Japan, and the top ten firms accounted for more than 80 per cent 
of that. 
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Table 2 Main apparel exporters of Myanmar to Japan (2007)
US$ in million Share (%)
Myanmar Daewoo International 15,024,103 24.4% JV with UMEHL Daewoo, South Korea 1990 3000 mens' shirts, working wear
Myanstar Garment 8,561,993 13.9% 100% foreign Starnesia, South Korea 2001 2500 mens's suits, working wear
TI Garment 6,146,930 10.0% 100% foreign Tomiya Apparel, Itochu Japan 2002 1050 men's shirts, casual and jackets
Myanmar Postarion 5,484,269 8.9% 100% foreign Matsuoka, HK (originally Japan) 2000 1000 working wear
Shining Access 3,572,586 5.8% Myanmar private (Japan affiliated) 2000 500 men's shirts
Dragon State 3,279,816 5.3% 100% foreign H.W.A. Glory, Tomen,
HK&Japan
1995 1200 men's shirts, jackets and slacks
Myanmar Hae Wae 2,182,898 3.6% 100% foreign Hae Wae, South Korea 1998 1080 jackets, trousers
Asian Just 2,024,118 3.3% Myanmar private (Japan affiliated) 1997 700 men's suits
Famoso 1,825,609 3.0% 100% foreign Daiei Kisei Fuku, Japan 2003 647 men's suits
Diamond Arrow 1,820,227 3.0% (transferred to Blessing Intertrade) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mega One Garment 1,464,061 2.4% Myanmar private － 2001 800 working wear
Myanmar Glogon 1,323,239 2.2% JV with private Global Yes, South Korea 1998 2000 jackets, coats, best
Asia Rose Mfg. 1,296,918 2.1% Myanmar private (Japan affiliated) men's slacks
Myanmar Guston Molinel＊ 1,055,274 1.7% 100% foreign Guston Molinel, France 1997 450 working wear
Kyi Khant 983,155 1.6% Myanmar private － 2001 500 jackets, and slacks
Myanmar Hwa Fuh 917,205 1.5% (transferred to Dragon State)
Yangon Pan Pacific 879,201 1.4% 100% foreign Pan Pacific, South Korea 1998 n.a. n.a.
A-1 Garment 658,212 1.1% Myanmar private － 2001 1000 jackets, coats, slacks
Blessing Intertrade 620,502 1.0% Myanmar private (Japan affiliated) 2007 600 slacks, working wear
Myanmar Segye 393,305 0.6% JV with UMEHL Segye, South Korea 1990 1400 jackets, slacks, skirts
Others 1,951,528.0 3.2%
Total 61,465,149 100.0% － － － － －
(Note) ＊A Japanese firm bought the factory in 2005, and the name was changed to Sakura Garment.
(Source) Myanmar Textile and Garment Directory, various numbers, companies' pamphlets, and autor's interviews.
Main export itemsCompany name
Exports (2007)
Ownership Foreing partners
Establishe
d year
Number of
workers
(2007)
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Goto et al. (2011:366) discusses that Japanese trading companies or brand apparel 
firms usually coordinate value chains for the Japanese market, while Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Korean traders do the same for the United States and EU markets. To meet 
the stringent quality requirements and precise specifications of Japanese retailers, 
Japanese buyers are strongly committed to raising the technical capacity of suppliers in 
developing countries. In other words, Japanese buyers do not buy on-the-spot. They 
often dispatch their technical staff to suppliers on a relatively long-term basis, mostly at 
their expense, to raise suppliers’ capacity to meet their required quality and 
specifications. The Japanese market was not easy for Myanmar apparel firms to enter 
immediately after the sanctions imposed by the United States. However, once the 
Japanese buyers commit to suppliers at their own cost, it is only logical for them to 
continue purchasing apparel from these suppliers to recover their initial expenses. 
In this fashion, Myanmar’s exports to Japan have constantly and steadily increased 
since 2003. Once Myanmar was given market access, it was able to enhance its 
production and exports even to the Japanese market, a difficult one for apparel firms in 
low-income countries. 
Myanmar’s apparel exports to the Japanese market will likely increase in the coming 
years. In spite of the steady growth of Myanmar’s apparel exports to Japan, Myanmar’s 
share of total Japanese apparel imports was just 1.3 per cent in 2012, equivalent to 1.6 
per cent of China’s total import share in the same year (Table 3). Notwithstanding the 
wide-spread idea of “China Plus One,” China’s share in Japanese apparel imports has 
not declined, keeping at nearly 80 per cent, for the period between 2005 and 2012. The 
second largest import source of apparel to Japan was Vietnam, with a share of 6.5 per 
cent in 2012. 
This means that a shift of 1.6 per cent of Japan’s imports of Chinese apparel to 
Myanmar would double Myanmar’s production for the Japanese market. A similar shift 
of about three per cent would double Myanmar’s total apparel production. A small drive 
for Japanese apparel buyers’ “China Plus One” strategy will actually cause a sizeable 
increase in demand for made-in-Myanmar apparel.6 
 
                                                 
6 The same story applies to South Korea’s case, too. 
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Table 3 Japan's imports of apparel
Growth
US$ million Share US$ million Share (times)
1 China 14194.3 76.2% 25104.2 78.3% 1.8
2 Vietnam 579.7 3.1% 2089.9 6.5% 3.6
3 Italy 881.9 4.7% 817.8 2.6% 0.9
4 Indonesia 208.6 1.1% 634.7 2.0% 3.0
5 Bangladesh 16.9 0.1% 486.3 1.5% 28.8
6 Thailand 259.8 1.4% 429.0 1.3% 1.7
7 Myanmar 4.6 0.0% 408.2 1.3% 89.4
8 India 136.3 0.7% 292.8 0.9% 2.1
9 South Korea 805.5 4.3% 211.0 0.7% 0.3
10 Cambodia 1.7 0.0% 190.8 0.6% 109.4
World Total 18617.8 100.0% 32060.0 100.0% 1.7
(Note) HS61 (Knit Apparel) and HS62 (Woven Apparel) are combined.
(Source) Calculated from World Trade Atlas.
Rank Country
2005 2012
 
Thus, market access does matter. During the military government period, Myanmar 
suffered from a lack of or limited access to international markets. Considering the 
experience of Vietnam’s apparel industry, Myanmar’s apparel industry would have 
rapidly grown in the first decade of the 21st century if it were granted market access to 
the United States and EU. 
With Myanmar’s new civilian government, in place since March 2011, pushing for 
real changes in international relations and on the political front, the United States and 
EU have already relaxed and/or lifted their sanctions against Myanmar. The 
international business community now regards this country as Asia’s last frontier, as 
opposed to one of the outposts of tyranny.7 Myanmar’s apparel industry has regained 
access to international markets including those of the United States, the EU, and others. 
Moreover, the “China Plus One” strategy will encourage more orders to come to 
Myanmar. 
 
 
4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Myanmar’s Apparel Firms 
 
With access to international markets, demands for made-in-Myanmar apparel will 
                                                 
7 “Outposts of tyranny” was a term used in 2005 by United States Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice to characterize the governments of certain countries as being totalitarian regimes or 
dictatorships. Burma (Myanmar) was named as one of outposts of tyranny together with Belarus, 
Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Zimbabwe. 
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substantially increase in the new international environment. However, the business 
environment surrounding Myanmar’s apparel industry has drastically changed in recent 
years. A sharp rise in the real exchange rate of the local currency pushed up apparel 
workers’ wages in terms of US dollars. Many labor strikes for higher pay occurred in 
2012 and 2013. Challenges facing the Myanmar’s apparel industry now are expanding 
its production capacity to meet increased demand and remaining competitive in 
international markets. 
This section includes an assessment of the competitiveness of Myanmar’s apparel 
industry by examining availability of productive factors and production and logistics 
costs. Thus, advantages and disadvantages that apparel firms in Myanmar experience 
are assessed. 
 
4.1 Initial Investment Requirement 
The apparel industry requires only a small amount of initial investment, which is mainly 
spent on sewing machines. For example, an entrepreneur who was interviewed by the 
author in September 2005 indicated that a leather shoe factory, which is also considered 
to be labor-intensive, generally required an investment four times larger than that for an 
apparel factory for the same scale of workforce.8 
This is an ideal feature of the industry for Myanmar, where national entrepreneurs 
face severe financial constraints and full-fledged foreign investment had long been 
suppressed by the military government. According to a survey conducted by the author 
in 2005 under the title “Survey on Garment Industry in Myanmar (SGIM),” the average 
ratio of equity to debt for 142 sample firms engaged in apparel production was as high 
as 98 per cent in 2004. This implies that they were mostly self-financed. There were 
only eight firms among the 142 that received bank loans. 
Myanmar’s banking sector is still small and segmented. A private banking sector 
exists in Myanmar, but their lending is heavily constrained. It is difficult for the banks 
to determine the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers as financial information and 
auditing is weak and small enterprises are not required to produce financial statements 
(OECD, 2013:66). In such a situation, the apparel industry is the main export industry 
                                                 
8 This entrepreneur had long business experience in both the apparel and footwear 
industries in Myanmar. 
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that national companies in Myanmar can enter on the basis of their own financial 
strength. 
 
4.2 Labor Availability, Wages, and Educational Background 
Most apparel factories in Myanmar operate on the basis of cutting, making, and packing 
(CMP) arrangements. Overseas buyers do everything except production; they find 
customers, design products with detailed specifications, and procure and supply raw 
materials to apparel factories in Myanmar. Apparel factories in Myanmar do the cutting, 
sewing, and packing only. They then export all products to overseas markets (Kudo, 
2009a:79). The business operation of apparel factories with CMP arrangements thus 
includes production and logistics costs only, and these consist of items such as labor 
wages, electricity and diesel, transportation, communications, factory and office rentals, 
maintenance and repair of sewing machines, and administrative expenses. The most 
important cost item among these is labor wages.9 
 
4.2.1 Labor Availability 
One of the most obvious advantages of Myanmar is the availability of abundant, 
low-wage, and relatively well-educated labor. The working-age population (15−59 years 
of age) increased from 20.6 million (56 per cent of the total population) in FY1985 to 
32.7 million (59 per cent of the total) in FY2005, and further to 36.9 million (62 per 
cent of the total) in FY2010 (CSO 2006 and 2011).10 There are a large number of 
unemployed and underemployed workers in Myanmar’s labor markets, especially in 
rural areas. Fujita (2009:250) estimated that agricultural labor households with no 
tillage rights of land constituted 20−40 percent of households in rural Myanmar. He also 
indicated that their real wage rate in rice terms (rice wage) declined to 50−60 per cent 
during the last two to three decades (Fujita, 2009:260). This segment of the population 
could be mobilized to become apparel workers once industrialization and urbanization 
accelerates. 
 
                                                 
9 According to IDE Garment Firm Surveys in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Madagascar, labor cost 
occupied 47 per cent of value-added of garment firms in each country. 
10 FY stands for “fiscal year,” a year starting from April and ending in March. 
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4.2.2 Labor Wages 
The average monthly wages of sewing-machine-operators in Myanmar were about 
US$20 between late 2000 and mid-2005 (Kudo ed., 2008b).11 Kudo (2010) confirms the 
average monthly wages of workers in 2004 were US$18 based on his survey of 100 
sewing-machine operators in Yangon. These were among the lowest wages in Asia. 
Since then, wages of apparel workers in Myanmar have risen to almost double by April 
2008. According to this author’s interviews with eight apparel firms in Yangon in April 
2008,12 average monthly wages were US$38 and ranged from US$32 to US$43. A 
similar level of estimated wages was given by the ERIA-CLMV Survey of 2008 
(Table4).13 According to this survey, the average monthly wages of general workers 
including sewing operators in Yangon, Myanmar were US$35 in 2008, while those in 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia were found to be US$80. Average wages of Myanmar workers 
were lower than the Cambodian minimum wages of US$50 for apparel and footwear 
workers at that time.14 
 
Table 4 Average monthly wages, 2008
(US$)
National
(60 Firms)
Yangon
(30 Firms)
National
(76 Firms)
Phnom Penh
(62 Firms)
Worker 36.1 35.0 79.0 80.0
Middle Managemen 110.6 118.4 209.0 217.0
Engineer 111.3 116.6 464.0 467.0
(Source) ERIA-CLMV Survey of 2008.
Myanmar Cambodia
(Note) Wages for Myanmar were converted from kyats to US dollars with the
parallel exchange rate of 1,250 kyats per US dollar as of November, 2008.
 
                                                 
11 In general, international buyers of apparel products pay more attention to wages in US dollars 
than those denominated in local currencies. In this research, the author converted Myanmar worker 
wages in kyats into US dollars using parallel exchange rates. 
12 See Kudo ed. (2008b) for details of interviews. 
13 A survey was conducted by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia 
(ERIA)-CLMV study team in November-December, 2008 to assess the business and investment 
environment in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Sixty firms were surveyed in 
Myanmar. Of these, 30 were located in Yangon, 20 in Mandalay, and 10 in Myeik. Ten firms were 
apparel industries; nine of these were located in Yangon and one in Mandalay. There were 76 firms 
surveyed in Cambodia; 62 of these were in Phnom Penh. As for the detailed results of ERIA-CLMV 
Survey, 2008, see Kudo (2009b). 
14 In addition to unskilled labor, the salaries of middle management and engineers in Myanmar were 
found to be lower than in Cambodia, even though the quality and qualification of those human 
resources were unknown and may not be exactly comparable. 
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The wages of apparel workers in Myanmar continued to increase, and labor strikes 
started to break out following the legalization of labor organizations and the loosened 
grip on security under the civilian government. According to some domestic media, it is 
said there were more than 800 labor strikes in Myanmar in 2012 and early 2013, and 
many of them broke out in apparel factories. Given the guidance of Myanmar’s 
government, the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA) proposed 
model wages for apparel workers around May−June, 2013 (Table 5). These model 
wages comprised basic salary, cost-of-living allowance, overtime, and regular 
attendance and productivity bonuses. If a skilled sewing operator (Grade B) works 27 
days per month with 88 hours overtime, then she will earn US$84 per month, which is 
equivalent to the minimum wage of Cambodian workers as of May 2013.15 It is reported 
that many apparel workers who joined the strikes agreed to the model wages. 
 
Table 5 MGMA's proposed model wages for apparel workers
regular
attendance
productivity
bonus
total
wages
daily monthly daily monthly hourly monthly monthly monthly monthly monthly
(US$)
Sewing operators (Grade B) 1150 31050 500 13500 313 27544 5000 5000 82094 84
Sewing operators (Grade C) 1100 29700 300 8100 300 26400 3000 3000 70200 72
Trainees 1000 27000 100 2700 273 24024 3000 0 56724 58
(Source) Myanmar Times  dated June 11-17, 2012.
basic salary cost-of-living
allowance
overtime
(Notes) 1) Workers are supposed to work 27 days per month. 2) The exchange rate of kyat is 975 kyats per US dollar on August 2, 2013, based on
the Central Bank of Myanmar's reference rate.
 
Table 6 shows the historical trend of apparel workers’ wages in Myanmar and its 
related figures. This table is constructed from the various surveys and author’s 
interviews mentioned earlier. According to this table, the wages of apparel workers in 
terms of US dollars increased by about two times for the period of 2004−2008, while 
they increased by 2 to 2.4 times for the period of 2008−2013. There are two factors 
behind such a constant increase. 
 
                                                 
15 The minimum wages include health allowances, but exclude transportation costs, attendance 
bonus and overtime. 
 20 
Table 6 Approximate monthly wages of apparel workers
Month/Year Wages in
Kyat
Exchange
rates
(Kyat/US$)
Wages in
US$
CPI
（2004=1.0）
Wages in real
terms (Kyat)
Increase in
real wages
(Kyat)
Year 2000 - - about 20 - -
June-Sept.
2004 17,800 1,000 18 1.0 17,800 -
April 2008
39,000～
42,000 1,110 35～38 2.0
19,500～
21,000 10%～18%
May 2013 70,000～
82,000
975 72～84 2.3 30,000～
36,000
54%～85%
Growth for
2004-2013
3.9～4.6
times - 4.0～4.7times 2.7 times
(Source) Wages in kyat for Year 2000 are based on the author's inverviews, those for
Year 2004 are based on SGIM (2005), those for Year 2008 is based on the author's
interviews in Yangon in April 2008 (Kudo ed., 2008J), and those for Year 2013 is based
on the MGMA's model wages in May-June 2013. Exchange rates are from market
sources. CPI is from CSO SMEI (various numbers).
1.7～2.0 times
 
First, inflation appears to cause a constant rise in apparel workers’ wages in kyat, the 
local currency. The consumer prices index (CPI) increased by two times for the period 
of 2004−2008. As a result, the rise in nominal wages in kyat was mostly offset by 
inflation, and workers’ real wages increased marginally for this period. On the other 
hand, inflation was contained for the period of 2008−2013, and consequently, the real 
wages of apparel workers increased by 54 per cent to 85 per cent for the said period. It 
must be noted, however, that the model wages of 2003 presuppose 27 working days per 
month with 88 hours overtime (more than three hours per day). Realized wages could be 
lower, though no survey has been conducted. In addition, CPI is sometimes criticized as 
underestimating the real inflation rates in Myanmar due to a distorted consumption 
basket and a defect in the price reporting system. Moreover, living costs in Yangon are 
apparently increasing more rapidly than in other local cities and rural areas. The actual 
improvement of the living standards of Myanmar’s apparel workers could be much 
smaller than the figures indicated in Table 6. 
Second, the kyat appreciation in real terms caused a sharp rise of wages in terms of 
the US dollar. Workers’ wages (in US$) increased by 4.0–4.7 times for the period of 
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2004−2013, which is much higher than for real wages denominated in kyat. The gap is 
largely explained by kyat appreciation in real terms. The nominal exchange rate of kyat 
against the US dollar did not change much for the period of 2004−2013. However, 
Myanmar experienced high inflation for the said period. Therefore, the kyat’s real 
exchange rate appreciated by 200 per cent in the five-year period of 2006−2011, 
declining the value of the US dollar in Myanmar to one third of its previous level.16 
This steeply pushed up the wages of Myanmar’s workers in terms of the US dollar. 
The competitiveness of Myanmar’s apparel industry has been based on its low-wage 
workforce. With the kyat’s appreciation, the gap in wages in US dollars between 
Myanmar’s workers and those in its neighboring countries is getting smaller. For 
example, the annual labor costs paid to one worker in Myanmar were US$1,100 in 2012, 
while those in Bangladesh and Cambodia were US$1,478 and US$1,424, respectively, 
in the same year (JETRO, 2012:64).17 Myanmar’s apparel industry is now required to 
improve its productivity and quality for remaining competitive in the international 
market. 
 
4.2.3 Educational Background 
It is difficult to know the quality of workers, but educational background may be 
regarded as an effective, though not the best, proxy for it.18 Myanmar citizens are 
relatively well-educated, and its literacy rate is considerably higher than that of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Bangladesh (Table 7). Myanmar’s literacy rate for women is 
almost as high as that for men. This is important for the apparel industry in Myanmar 
since women constitute a majority of the labor force in this sector. Gross school 
enrollment rates for primary education are more than 100 per cent for all countries 
except Bangladesh. Apparel sewing generally requires workers to have basic education 
only, and all the countries in the table except Bangladesh meet such requirements. 
Myanmar also has secondary and tertiary school enrollment ratios comparable to 
                                                 
16 Kubo (2012) examined the sources of kyat appreciation, and identified administrative controls on 
foreign exchange and imports as well as a resource boom as main sources. 
17 The figures are based on JETRO’s survey on Japanese-affiliated firms only in the 
said countries. They may not represent the labor cost level of local firms. 
18  Fukunishi and Yamagata (2013:5) points out extensive education is not required for 
sewing-machine operators in developing countries by referring to some economics literature. 
However, educational background is one of measurable indicators for human capital. 
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Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Bangladesh, although they are behind Vietnam. 
 
Table 7 Literacy rate and school enrollment rate
GDP per
capita (2013)
(% of people
ages 15 and
above)
(% of females
ages 15 and
above)
(primary; %
gross)
(secondary; %
gross)
(tertiary; %
gross) (current US$)
Myanmar 92.3 (2010) 89.9 (2010) 125.6 (2010) 54.3 (2010) 14.8 (2011) 884
Cambodia 73.9 (2009) 65.9 (2009) 125.6 (2011) 44.4 (2008)  14.5 (2011) 1,017
Lao PDR 72.7 (2005) 63.2 (2005) 126.0 (2011) 45.8 (2011)  17.7 (2011) 1,587
Vietnam 93.2 (2010) 91.1 (2010) 106.3 (2011) 57.2 (1998) 24.4 (2011) 1,705
Bangladesh 56.8 (2010) 52.2 (2010) 88.9 (2004) 51.9 (2011) 13.6 (2011) 891
China 94.3 (2010) 91.3 (2010) 113.1 (2011) 81.4 (2011) 26.8 (2011) 6,629
(Source) World Bank, World Development Indicators , on-line, accessed August 5, 2013.
Literacy rate School enrollment
 
According to the ERIA-CLMV Survey, the educational level of Myanmar’s general 
workers was significantly higher than that of Cambodia in 2008 (Table 8). Almost all 
workers in Myanmar had formal schooling, while about 20 per cent of Cambodian 
workers did not. Nearly half of Myanmar’s workers received a middle school education, 
but only about 30 per cent of Cambodian workers achieved this level. Finally, about 10 
per cent of Myanmar’s workers graduated colleges or universities, while virtually no 
Cambodian workers received such education. In conclusion, apparel workers in 
Myanmar have comparable, or better, educational backgrounds as its competitors such 
as Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Bangladesh. 
 
Table 8 Educational background of workers, 2008
(%)
National
(60 Firms)
Yangon
(30 Firms)
National
(76 Firms)
Phnom
Penh  (62
Firms)
No formal schooling 0.4 0.8 21.0 21.3
Elementary school 21.6 19.7 27.0 27.3
Middle-high school 46.5 45.1 27.8 27.8
High school 18.9 18.9 17.9 17.1
Technical/vocational school 1.8 2.0 5.6 5.6
College/University 10.9 13.6 0.8 0.9
Graduate school 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Source) ERIA-CLMV Survey of 2008.
Myanmar Cambodia
(Note) We asked owners and/or managers of firms to classify their workers’
educational background according to the grades shown in the table. Then, we
averaged share of workers in each grade over the sample firms.
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4.2.4 Labor Issues 
Despite a nation-wide surplus of labor, there has been an occasional shortage of 
apparel workers in Yangon. Behind this shortage lies stagnant growth in the purchasing 
power of apparel workers’ wages, as discussed above. Due to increased living costs in 
Yangon and the slow rise in wages, many apparel workers have difficulty surviving in 
Yangon, and some go abroad to seek jobs with higher wages. Many apparel workers, 
particularly experienced ones, appear to have migrated to Mae Sot, a town on the 
Myanmar–Thailand border, where many apparel factories have congregated (Kudo and 
Kuroiwa, 2009). 
Another challenge is high labor turnover in the apparel industry. The ERIA-CLMV 
Survey contains questions on subjective evaluation of labor issues. Table 9 shows that 
high labor turnover ratio is regarded as a more severe problem by 10 apparel firms of 
the 60 firms interviewed nationwide. Compared to other industries, apparel firms also 
faced more severe difficulties in recruiting workers. 
All these challenges may eventually erode Myanmar’s primary advantage in terms of 
availability of an abundant, low-wage, and well-educated labor force. Some apparel 
factories began to relocate to Bago, about 80 km northeast of Yangon, and to Pathein, 
about 190 km west of Yangon, where worker recruitment was easier and turnover rates 
lower. The civilian government is also considering permitting the construction of 
worker dormitories on the factories’ premises. The military government did not allow 
workers to live in dormitories adjacent to factories, due to fear of labor strikes cum 
political protests. They also closed all university dormitories for the same reason. With 
all these efforts, the apparel industry in Myanmar needs to secure workers in a 
sustainable manner. 
 
 24 
Table 9 Average firm rating on labor, 2008
National
(60 Firms)
Garment
(10 Firms)
National
(76 Firms)
Phnom Penh
(62 Firms)
Quality of workers 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2
Quality of middle management 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.3
Quality of engineers 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.3
Labor cost 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3
Ease of recruiting workers 3.5 3.1 3.3 3.2
Labor turnover 3.4 2.7 3.1 3.0
Labor Relations 3.6 3.7 3.1 3.0
Average 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
(Notes) Ratings utilize the following scale: 1=very poor, 2=poor, 3=fair, 4=good and 5=excellent.
           Out of 62 firms in Phnom Penh, 52 deals with garments.
(Source) ERIA-CLMV Survey of 2008.
Myanmar Cambodia
 
 
4.3 Electricity and Energy 
Although apparel factories in Myanmar can employ relatively low-wage workers, 
factories must pay more for electricity and diesel than firms in other competitor 
countries. Electricity in Myanmar is by far the poorest of infrastructural services. 
According to the aforementioned Garment Survey of 2005, the shortage and 
unreliability of the electricity supply has been a severe obstacle for apparel production 
(Kudo, 2010). In the same survey, 69 of 139 respondents answered that they had 
experienced power interruptions more than three times a day, and these had often lasted 
more than three hours. Consequently, 134 out of 141 respondents used or shared their 
own generators. 
The electricity supply did not improve much by the end of 2008. In the ERIA-CLMV 
Survey of 2008, firms were asked to rate infrastructure services using a five-point scale 
where 1 means “very poor” and 5 means “excellent.” The average rating of electricity in 
Myanmar was considerably lower than that in Cambodia (Table 10). However, firms in 
each country answered the questionnaire independently, and may not have known of the 
situation in other countries. Nevertheless, the average rating of electricity in Myanmar 
was significantly lower than the average rating of other infrastructure services in the 
country. Thus, the poor electricity supply can be identified as one of the most serious 
obstacles for manufacturers in Myanmar. 
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Table 10 Average firm rating of infrastructure, 2008
National
(60 Firms)
Yangon
(30 Firms)
National
(76 Firms)
Phnom
Penh  (62
Firms)
Electricity 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.0
Water 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.4
Gas/Fuel 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.3
Transportation 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.3
Telecommunication 3.1 2.8 3.4 3.5
Industrial estates 2.9 2.7 3.5 3.5
Accommodation for foreigners 3.3 3.0 3.7 3.7
Average 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.4
(Notes) Ratings utilize the following scale: 1=very poor, 2=poor, 3=fair, 4=good and 5=excellent.
(Source) ERIA-CLMV Survey of 2008.
Myanmar Cambodia
 
One apparel factory interviewed in April 2008 was 100 per cent foreign-owned (Hong 
Kong) and had 1,050 workers. At that time, total wages were US$40,000 (US$38 per 
capita) per month, but electricity costs were US$7,000 per month. Diesel for running a 
generator when the factory had power failures was US$4,000 per month. As a result, 
expenses for electricity and diesel were about 30 per cent of the labor costs in the 
factory. The electricity supply of this particular factory was better than that of other 
private factories because it was located on a plot of land leased from the Ministry of 
Industry No.1.19 A nearby apparel factory suffered a much more severe shortage of 
electricity. They experienced a three-hour blackout daily during the rainy season and 
had only three hours of electricity daily during the dry season. 
Another example is a domestic apparel factory in Myanmar with 415 workers. Total 
wages were US$18,400 (US$44 per capita) per month. Electricity charges were US$960, 
and the cost for diesel was US$6,100. The sum of these costs was equivalent to 38 per 
cent of the labor costs. This may represent a more general and prevalent situation than 
the first case because this factory was located in an industrial zone along with many 
other similar apparel factories. According to the Garment Survey of 2005, the ratio of 
electricity and diesel costs to wages was 39 per cent. Thus, expenses for electricity and 
diesel easily outweigh any reduction in production costs that result from the inexpensive 
wages paid to Myanmar’s workers. 
                                                 
19 There were two ministries of industry in Myanmar. One was primarily in charge of light 
industries such as those manufacturing consumer goods. The other was in charge of heavy industries 
such as those manufacturing capital goods. The two was merged in August 2012, to become Ministry 
of Industry. 
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However, there was a sign of improvement in electricity supply in 2010. A follow-up 
survey of SGIM of 2005 was conducted in 2011, and the author refers to it as the SGIM 
of 2011. In this survey, we asked the same 59 companies of SGIM of 2005 the same 
question on the situation of the electricity supply. The summary of answers is shown in 
Table 11. In SGIM of 2005, 24 companies answered that the electricity supply was a 
very severe obstacle in the firms’ operations, and 22 companies regarded it as a major 
obstacle. In SGIM of 2011, the numbers were reduced to three and five, respectively. 
On the contrary, 36 companies regarded electricity supply either as a minor or no 
obstacle for their operation. Moreover, there were many projects to increase electricity 
supply under the Thein Sein administration. International donors started to resume their 
full-fledged economic assistance, and thus power supply seems to steadily increase in 
the near future. 
 
Table 11 Apparel firms' assessment of electricity in Yangon, 2010
Very
severe
obstacle
Major
obstacle
Moderate
obstacle
Minor
obstacle
No
obstacle
Do not
know Total
SGIM (2005) for Year 2004 24 22 5 5 3 0 59
SGIM (2011) for Year 2010 3 5 14 24 12 1 59
(Source) SGIM, 2005 and 2011.
(Note) The same fifty-nine apparel firms are respondents for both SGIM 2005 and 2011.
 
4.4 Logistics and Communication 
Once an apparel factory moves to Myanmar, it must pay additional logistics costs. Due 
to underdevelopment of upstream and supporting industries, apparel factories in 
Myanmar must generally import all raw materials and auxiliary items with the probable 
exception of carton boxes and plastic bags. After sewing, all products are exported to 
overseas markets. International buyers placing orders with apparel factories in Myanmar 
by CMP arrangements must bear these transportation costs. A negative aspect for them 
is that transportation fees to ship cargo to and from Yangon are higher than the fees 
charged at international seaports in neighboring countries. 
Table 12 shows freight charges for vessels shipping from the Port of Yangon in 
Myanmar, Leam Chabang Port in Thailand, and Port of Singapore. Freight charges for 
outgoing vessels from the Port of Yangon are more expensive than other major ports 
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such as the Port of Bangkok or Leam Chabang. According to an interview with a 
manager of a freight forwarder in Yangon20, if an apparel firm in Yangon ships one 
20-foot container to Tokyo or Yokohama, it costs US$1,300 and takes about 20 days. By 
contrast, it costs US$1,340 to transport a 40-foot container from Leam Chabang Port to 
the Port of Tokyo or Yokohama and takes only eight to nine days. This is due to 
economies of scale in transportation, and Leam Chabang Port has a much larger number 
of calling vessels. The World Bank (2009:172) reports that it costs about US$400 to 
ship a container to the United States from China, about US$800 to ship from India, and 
US$1,300 to ship from Sierra Leone. China’s enormous trade is a major reason for low 
transport costs, and these falling transport costs have encouraged countries to move 
production to China. Leam Chabang Port also provides more reliable transport and 
handling services than the Port of Yangon. 
 
Table 12 Freight charges for 20-foot containers (US$)
From Yangon Port to From Leam Chabang Port to From Singapore to
Freight
Charges
Freight
Charges
2007
March
2007
September
2008
March
2008
February
2008
February
Singapore 480 265 1050 6 days 450 2 days - -
Bangkok 685 475 1250 14 days 80 0-1day 450 2 days
Port Klang 580 400 1038 5 days 400 3-5 days - 1 day
Jakarta &
Surabaya 800 460 1050 5 days 700 5-8 Days 200 2 days
Yokohama 1340(40 FCL)* 8-9 days 940(40 FCL)* 7 days
Calcutta 925 940 1725 14 days
Qingdao 900 655 1350 10 days
Cebu 1150 800 1300 14 days
(Note) *Freight charges from Leam Chabang/Singapore -Yokohama are for 40-foot containers that are "full container loaded" (FCL).
(Source) Freight charges for vessels departing from Yangon Port are from MIFFA. Freight charges for vessels departing from Leam
Chabang Port and Singapore are from JETRO (2008:262-263).
Port of
Destination
Freight Charges
Travel Time Travel Time Travel Time
(All vessels go to Japan via Singapore or Port Klang.)
 
Freight charges for outbound vessels from the Port of Yangon tend to fluctuate widely 
and a seasonal factor does exist. According to a freight forwarder in Yangon, about two 
thirds of Myanmar’s exports from the Port of Yangon in 2007 were agricultural produce 
such as beans, pulses, and rice; most of the remaining exports were apparel. As 
agricultural produce exports peak between February and May after harvesting, freight 
                                                 
20 This interview was made on April 30, 2008. 
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charges for outbound vessels tend to increase in this season. 
In addition to this seasonal factor, a wide fluctuation of freight charges also results 
from the small number of calling vessels at the Port of Yangon. The volume of container 
handling of all ports in Myanmar (including Yangon, Sittway, and Mawlamyine) was 
only 165,384 TEU21 in FY2005. Leam Chabang Port alone handled 3.76 million TEU 
containers.22 Only small vessels call at the Port of Yangon and are have been moving 
their cargo to the Port of Singapore, Port Klang, Port of Bangkok, or Laem Chabang 
Port. At these ports, shipments are aggregated into much larger and faster ships for 
longer hauls. There are only five liners at the Port of Yangon. These include Myanmar 
Five Star (a national flag carrier) and four foreign liners. The capacity of calling vessels 
is small due to the shallow depth of the river, which is about 400 TEU in the rainy 
season and 300 TEU in the dry season. It is obvious that apparel firms located in 
Bangkok and its suburbs have an advantage in logistics over those in Yangon and its 
suburbs. 
Myanmar’s apparel factories can consider utilizing road transport between Yangon, 
Myanmar and Bangkok, Thailand to reduce transportation time. Table 13 shows a 
comparison of transport time between road and marine transport from Bangkok and 
Yangon.23 Road transport could offer advantageous alternative logistics to the marine 
route in terms of time. It took 68.3 hours for a truck to run from Yangon to Ayutthaya, 
Thailand via the Myawaddy−Mae Sot Border Gate. On the other hand, marine transport 
took 21.5 days. This road route is part of East-West Economic Corridor proposed by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). By utilizing road transport, apparel factories in 
Yangon could shorten not only export time but also import time. If they can import 
textile and other raw materials from Thailand, they could substantially reduce the 
production lead-time. This may make it possible for them to produce fashion and 
seasonal apparel items that require a quick turnaround time. 
 
                                                 
21 TEU stands for “20-foot equivalent units,” which is the measure of a box 20 feet long 
and 8 feet wide with a maximum gross mass of 24 metric tons (WB [2009:178]). 
22 The figure for Myanmar comes from the Myanmar Port Authority; the one for Laem 
Chabang is from Ootaka (2007:57). 
23 Road transportation figures are based on a trial run by a truck arranged by JETRO in November 
2012. 
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Table 13 Comparison between road and marine transport (time)
<Road transport*> (Hrs) <Marine transport> (Days)
Transport time 62.4 Transport time 17.5
 Ayutthaya-Mae Sot 10.5  Time on the sea 15
 Mae Sot-Yangon 16.1  Ayutthaya-Leam Chabang Port 0.5
 Waiting time 35.8 Delivery in Yangon 2
Customs clearance 5.9 Customs clearance 4
 Export (Thai side) 0.5  Export (Thai side) 1
 Import (Myanmar side) 5.4  Import (Myanmar side) 3
Total 68.3 Total 21.5
(Note) *Time is based on a trial run of a truck for November 14-17, 2012.
(Source) JETRO (2013).  
However, the road route is not yet available for commercial cargo transportation. The 
road conditions on some parts of the route are dangerous for large vehicles to traverse. 
The 38 km road between Kawkareik and Thingan Nyi Naung crosses the Dawna Range, 
and a hilly section is restricted to one-way traffic, i.e., odd days for ascending vehicles 
and even days for descending vehicles. In addition, the border crossing through 
Myawaddy requires tedious and time-consuming negotiations with the Myanmar 
authorities in advance. 
Another obstacle is the high costs associated with road transport. Table 14 shows a 
comparison between road and marine transport for the same case of a trial run in 
November 2012. The total costs for road transport were three times higher than those 
for marine transport. Transport charges for a truck were five times higher than those of 
marine transport. This is mainly because the truck could not find cargoes for its return. 
Customs clearance charges at the Myawaddy−Mae Sot Border Gate were also higher 
than at the Port of Yangon. Transshipment of cargo from a Myanmar truck to a Thai 
truck is required at the border gate, which cost US$300. Both road infrastructure 
development and smoother crossings through border gates are necessary to make road 
transport between Yangon and Bangkok commercially viable. 
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Table 14 Comparison between road and marine transport (costs)
(US$)
Items Road* Marine
Transport charges 2,000 400
Customs clearance charges 400 160
Import license 200
Documents 250
Transshipment 300 0
Port charges 0 60
Others 300 30
Total 3,300 1,100
(Note) *Costs are based on a trial run of a truck for November 14-17, 2012.
(Source) JETRO (2013).
300
 
 
Communication services are also poor in Myanmar. Table 15 shows access to mobile 
phones, telephone lines, and the internet in CLMV, Bangladesh, and China. As of 2011, 
Myanmar had the lowest values in access to mobile phones and internet. What is worse, 
perhaps, is that the gap between Myanmar and others grew wider through the first 
decade of the 21st century, when all countries except Myanmar vigorously invested in 
their telecommunications infrastructure. Myanmar started substantial investment only 
after the establishment of the civilian government in 2011. 
 
Table 15 Telecommunication access in 2011
(per 100 people) Myanmar Cambodia Lao PDR Vietnam Bangladesh China
Mobile cellular subscriptions 2.6 96.2 87.2 143.4 56.1 73.2
Telephone lines 1.1 3.7 1.7 11.5 0.6 21.2
Internet users 1.0 3.1 9.0 35.1 5.0 38.3
(Note) Measures are based on 100 people.
(Source) World Bank, World Development Indicators , on-line.
 
4.5 Preferences to LDCs 
Availability of preferential treatment for advanced nations also affects the 
competitiveness of apparel industries in developing countries. Special and preferential 
treatment of exports from least developed countries (LDCs) makes a difference in 
success. For example, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offers 
preferential access to the United States markets for imports from Sub-Saharan African 
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countries and helps to create urban-based manufacturing employment in beneficiary 
countries (Sachs, 2005:195). 
In principle, LDCs are entitled to entertain preferential treatments given by importing 
countries. As an LDC, Myanmar shall be eligible for those preferences. However, since 
1997, Myanmar’s exports have been deprived the status that could be enjoyed under the 
EU’s GSP. Furthermore, from 2003 to 2012, the United States banned all imports from 
Myanmar. With the political and economic reforms of the Thein Sein administration, 
Myanmar is now enjoying preferential treatment. The EU decided to provide Myanmar 
with the Everything But Arms (EBA) treatment from July 2013 (EC, 2013). The US 
lifted its import ban of made-in-Myanmar products except some designated items such 
as jade and gems in November 2012. 
Myanmar’s apparel exports have long enjoyed tariff exemptions from Japan. Japan 
offers a scheme of special preferential treatment for LDCs, and never deprived 
Myanmar of such a status even under the military regime. While China and Vietnam 
have to bear a 7.4 to 10.0 per cent tariff on woven shirts and blouses for example, 
Myanmar, along with other LDCs, does not have to pay such tariffs as long as it meets 
the rules of origin. The tariff exemption has thus far promoted apparel exports from 
Myanmar to Japan. 
Nevertheless, many competitors other than LDCs have recently enjoyed preferential 
trade arrangement with proliferating free trade agreements (FTAs). The Japan–Vietnam 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JVEPA) came into effect in October 2009, and 
preferential treatment is accorded to its apparel exports to Japan provided their products 
meet the rules of origin. The ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(AJCEP) was also signed between Japan and ASEAN members, and the latter can enjoy 
preferential treatment for their apparel exports to Japan provided their products meet the 
rules of origin. Thus, preferential treatment given to LDCs is gradually becoming 
ineffective in terms of promotion of apparel exports to Japan. Myanmar needs to 
compete with other apparel producing countries on a level playing field. 
 
4.6 Advantages and Disadvantages 
The main location advantages of Myanmar include the availability of abundant, 
low-wage, and relatively well-educated labor, and preferential treatment for LDCs. The 
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main location disadvantages of Myanmar include shortage of electricity and expensive 
energy costs, costly and inefficient logistics, and poor communication services. 
Although we have not discussed this factor in detail, cumbersome and time-consuming 
administrative procedures are also identified as business obstacles in Myanmar. Thus, 
there are both advantages and disadvantages for apparel firms in Myanmar. Firms 
decide whether to locate in Myanmar based on a calculation of costs and benefits. 
The simple way to attract more apparel firms to Myanmar is to enhance the location’s 
advantages and reduce its disadvantages for potential investors, be they domestic or 
foreign. Myanmar’s most important location advantage is the availability of low-wage 
labor. However, it is difficult for the government to manipulate worker wages by policy 
intervention. Wages are principally determined by market forces, and the government 
has little leeway to intervene in labor markets or to change wages. The real exchange 
rate of the kyat decides the internationally comparable level of wages for workers in 
Myanmar. Here again, Myanmar’s government is powerless to control the real exchange 
rate. 
However, Myanmar’s government can reduce costs related to infrastructure and 
administrative services. The government can improve infrastructure services by 
instituting better public policies and promoting more public investment. The electricity 
supply should be the first priority. The rehabilitation and improvement of the Port of 
Yangon is also important for reducing transport costs and times. Transport services tend 
to enjoy economies of scale, so the government should attract more business 
establishments and plants, domestic and foreign, to Yangon. As demand for transport 
services increases, agglomerated firms will enjoy better transport services with cheaper 
prices and greater frequency. This will enhance the competitiveness of firms located in 
Yangon and will eventually attract more firms to that area. Thus, a virtuous cycle starts 
to evolve. The Port of Yangon should consider how to obtain rapid, frequent, cheaper, 
and more reliable access to the Port of Singapore. This port is a major Asian hub from 
which Myanmar’s products can be exported to global markets. Providing better feeder 
services from Yangon to Singapore should take priority. 
In a nutshell, low-wage workers alone are not enough to attract apparel firms to 
Myanmar. Wage differences between apparel workers in Thailand and those in 
Myanmar are quite big. However, such a gap may be wide enough to attract Myanmar’s 
workers to Thailand, but not wide enough for Thai apparel firms to relocate to Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s location advantages derived from labor costs can easily be offset by other 
disadvantages such as electricity shortages, costly and lengthy logistics, poor 
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telecommunication services, and administrative red tape (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Gaps in wages and other costs 
 
(Source) The author. 
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Myanmar is a country that apparently has comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
industries, including apparel sewing. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s apparel industry failed 
to grow as a leading industry of the economy, as in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Bangladesh. 
The growth of Myanmar’s apparel industry had been stunted by the sanctions from the 
West. On the contrary, the industry successfully increased its exports to Japan and South 
Korea, which did not impose sanctions on Myanmar even during military rule. The 
growth of apparel exports to these markets clearly shows Myanmar’s comparative 
advantage in this industry. Once it is given full access to the world markets, Myanmar’s 
apparel industry will certainly realize its potential comparative advantage, and such a 
China 
ASEAN4 
Myanmar 
Wage gap not wide enough for 
foreign firms to relocate to Myanmar 
G
ap
 i
n 
ot
he
r 
co
st
s 
w
id
e 
en
ou
gh
 t
o 
pr
ev
en
t 
fo
re
ig
n 
fir
m
s f
ro
m
 re
lo
ca
tin
g 
to
 M
ya
nm
ar
 
Wages 
Costs for electricity, logistics, and so forth 
Myanmar 
Public investment 
 34 
situation is currently becoming a reality. 
Now, a challenge for Myanmar’s apparel industry is meeting its increased orders with 
competitive prices, reasonable quality, and timely delivery. While the wages of apparel 
workers in China and middle-income ASEAN countries have sharply risen in recent 
years, Myanmar still has an abundance of relatively low-wage and educated workers. 
This is certainly an advantage for Myanmar. However, a wage gap alone is not wide 
enough for Myanmar to compete with China and advanced ASEAN members. For 
example, wages of apparel workers in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam were about twice as high 
as those in Yangon in 2012. This appears to be quite wide in terms of workers’ living 
standards, but it is not wide enough for apparel firms in Vietnam to relocate to Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s advantage in labor costs can easily be offset by other disadvantages such as 
electricity shortages and costly and unreliable logistics. 
To date, the apparel industry in Myanmar has endured through the efforts of the 
private sector without much government support, or in spite of bad government policy. 
However, such growth is limited. To reduce total production and logistics costs 
excluding labor wages, the government must play a bigger role. 
Therefore, it is good news that the new civilian government has been implementing 
wide-ranging economic reforms, and infrastructure and human resources development. 
Now, both the international and national environments have ceased suppressing the 
apparel industry in Myanmar, and it has the opportunity to realize its potential, although 
many challenges remain. We must carefully examine the obstacles and bottlenecks that 
apparel firms in Myanmar face, and launch a comprehensive and consistent program to 
overcome them. The apparel industry will then actively lead Myanmar’s economy to 
further climb the industrial ladder in the new international environment. 
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